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June 1988 ABSTRACT 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 unleashed market forces that have led 
to a number of changes in the U.S. airline industry.  Using a "best-practicen 
cost function approach,  this paper reports some of the airlines' early 
adaptations to this new environment.  Specifically, the paper presents 
estimates of the properties of the best-practice technology, measures of cost 
efficiency,  and changes in observed total factor productivity  (TFP)  growth for 
the U.S.  airline industry in the 1970s and early 1980s.  These results are 
obtained using a panel data set of 12 U.S.  airlines during the period from 
1970:IQ to  1981:IVQ  and using two new empirical techniques.  The first 
technique enables a multiproduct system of cost and input share equations to 
be estimated,  allowing for cost inefficiency.  The second technique is then 
employed to decompose observed TFP growth into technological progress, change 
in cost efficiency,  scale effects,  and network effects.  These analytical 
techniques provide useful insights into individual airline performance in the 
last years of full Civil Aeronautics Board regulation and in the first years 
of regulatory reform. TFP GROWTH. CHANGE IN EFFICIENCY. AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: 1970 TO 1981 
I.  Introduction 
The U.S. airline industry has undergone many changes in the 10 years since 
the Airline Deregulation Act  (ADA)  of 1978.  New carriers entered in the late 
1970s,  hub-and-spoke  networks became the norm in the early 1980s,  frequent 
flier plans gained wide acceptance and,  finally, many mergers and some 
failures occurred,  particularly in 1986.  These events can be explained 
largely by the technology available to the airline industry and by the cost 
performance of those airlines in operation at the time of the ADA. 
This paper employs two new empirical techniques to provide insights into 
these events.  The first,  developed by Bauer, Ferrier, and Lovell (1988), 
estimates a stochastic multiproduct cost frontier.  In contrast to techniques 
proposed by Schmidt (1984), Melfi (1984), and Bauer (1985),  this technique 
"solves" the Greene Problem in that it models in a qualitatively consistent 
way the relationship between the disturbances on the input share equations and 
the allocative inefficiency term in the cost equation.'  While this technique 
does not model the relationship between the allocative inefficiency terms in 
the cost and input share equations explicitly,  as in these earlier papers, one 
can obtain estimates of firm-  and time-specific cost inefficiency by extending 
a technique developed by Jondrow,  Lovell,  Materov,  and Schmidt  (1982). 
The second empirical technique decomposes observed total factor 
productivity  (TFP)  growth into various components related to returns to scale, technological progress,  and changes in cost efficiency,  a technique fully 
developed in Bauer  (1988).  Separating observed TFP into these components 
provides insights into the dynamic behavior of the airlines. 
This paper is divided into five sections.  Section I1 contains a brief 
overview of the airline industry under CAB regulation,  reviews Farrell's 
(1957)  measures of cost efficiency,  and discusses why the airlines may have 
been cost inefficient under regulation.  Section I11 presents the empirical 
techniques used to obtain estimates of the cost frontier and to decompose the 
observed measure of TFP growth.  Section IV briefly describes the data set and 
reports and discusses the empirical results.  Section V concludes with a 
discussion of how these results help explain some of the airlines' adaptations 
to their new environment. 
11.  Airline Regulation and Cost Efficiencv 
The Civil Aeronautics Board  (CAB)  maintained tight control over the 
domestic airline industry from 1938 to 1978.  The CAB regulated all the major 
phases of airline operations,  including the routes that airlines could serve 
and the fares they could charge.*  The allocation of new routes or the. 
approval of mergers was often dictated by  the CAB'S mandate to "promote the 
industry," which the CAB usually interpreted as "preserve the financial 
viability of the existing firms in the  industry."  Airlines that fell into 
financial difficulty often received profitable new routes to bail them out, 
reducing the incentive to operate efficiently. 
Costs also rose because regulation impaired the airlines' bargaining power 
with their labor unions.  Airlines produce a service that cannot be stored in 
anticipation of a strike.  Thus,  when an airline suffered a strike,  it lost 
much of its market to its competitors.  When the strike ended, the airline had no way of winning back its passengers.  It could not offer discounted fares, 
as United Airlines did successfully after a pilots' strike in the summer of 
1985.  Thus,  an airline's best strategy was to accede to the union demands, 
content with the expectation that in time other airlines would be forced to 
increase their labor compensation  commensurately.  Eventually,  the CAE would 
be forced to approve across-the-board fare increases to cover the increased 
labor costs. 
Accordingly, the regulated environment both restricted and protected the 
airlines,  reducing the pressure on them to minimize their costs.  Yet the cost 
function remains the standard by which the performance of individual firms 
should be measured.  Furthermore,  the cost function embodies the cost- 
minimizing technology that will influence the market structure that will 
evolve in the airline industry under deregulation.  The definitions that 
follow will be useful here. 
If a firm operates at minimum cost,  it is cost efficient;  if not, it is 
cost inefficient.  Farrell  (1957)  developed a measure of overall cost 
efficiency and decomposed that measure into measures of technical efficiency 
(using proportionally too much of all inputs) and allocative efficiency  (using 
the wrong mix of inputs).  These efficiency measures can be readily defined by 
referring to figure 1,  where the isoquant yy'  is associated with the firm's 
given rate of output, the isocost curve ww'  is determined by the input prices 
0  facing the firm,  and the input vector x  is observed producing the firm's 
given rate of output. 
0  The measure of overall cost efficiency is E -oa/oc, the ratio of minimum 
cost to observed cost  (note  the implicit use of the set of isocost curves). 
The measure of technical efficiency is ~~-ob/oc,  the ratio of cost when the 
firm operates on the isoquant  (using  the observed input mix) to observed cost. Finally, the measure of allocative efficiency is E~-oa/ob,  the ratio of  cost 
on the isoquant  (using  the observed input mix) to minimum cost.  These 
measures have the following three properties:  (1)  each measure is bounded by 
T  A  zero and one,  (2)  EO-E  .E , and  (3)  one minus any of these measures is the 
proportion by which costs could be lowered if that form of inefficiency were 
eliminated. 
Although this paper evaluates the performance of the airline industry 
relative to the cost frontier before and immediately after the deregulation of 
the industry, airline deregulation  was,  unfortunately,  a process,  not a 
discrete act at a specified time.  In fact,  "regulatory reformn  is a more 
accurate term for the process,  since the Department of Transportation and the 
Federal Aviation Administration,  respectively,  continue to regulate 
international service and safety.  The ADA passed in 1978,  and its provisions 
were phased in gradually,  with the CAB lingering on the scene until 1985. 
Determining just when deregulation began is further complicated because the 
CAB itself began to grant the airlines more control over their routes and 
fares as early as 1975.  "Peanut" and  "Supersaver"  fares were two examples of 
the CAB'S willingness to cede some autonomy to the airlines.  3 
This paper assumes that the deregulated era began on January 1,  1979,  but 
this arbitrary assumption leaves several problems associated with pre-  and 
post-deregulation  cost efficiency comparisons.  A number of external shocks to 
the airline industry occurred in the brief span between 1979 and 1981.  In 
1979,  oil prices increased sharply;  recessions occurred in the first half of 
1980 and the second half of 1981;  and in the summer of 1981,  the air traffic 
controllers went on strike.  These shocks certainly affected the airlines' 
adjustment to their new environment,  but are not modeled explicitly here. 111.  Empirical Techniques 
In  general,  the cost system to be estimated can be written 
where Cnt  and sin,  are the observed cost and input shares,  respectively. 
The arguments in the cost and input share equations  (subscripts  will be 
suppressed for the sake of convenience) are defined as follows: y is the 
vector of outputs,  w is the vector of input prices,  z is the vector of network 
characteristics, and t is a time index.  4 
The disturbances have the following interpretations:  In the cost 
equation, the cost inefficiency term,  u,  allows for an increase in observed 
cost over minimum cost attributable to technical and allocative inefficiency 
and is assumed to follow a truncated-normal distribution with mode p  and 
underlying variance a:  such that u>O.  The noise term,  v,  allows for variations 
in conditions such as the weather that affect costs but that are beyond the 
firm's control.  This term is assumed to  be  independent of u and to follow a 
normal distribution with a finite variance of a:.  Strictly speaking, it is 
incorrect to model the disturbances in the cost and input share equations as 
being independent,  since allocative inefficiency in the cost equation will clearly depend on the disturbances in the input share equations.  However, as 
Schmidt  (1984)  pointed out,  these terms will tend to be uncorrelated,  since 
both negative and positive deviations from efficient shares raise costs. 
In  the input share equations, the vector disturbance,  e,  allows for both 
allocative inefficiency and noise on the input share equations and is 
modeled as a normal random variable with a mean a and a covariance matrix n.5 
These sources of deviations of observed input shares from cost-efficient input 
shares may be either positive or negative,  since a  firm may over- or 
underemploy a given input.  The equation permits persistent deviations of 
observed input shares from cost-efficient input shares by the vector mean 
a.  Ideally, this disturbance,  e,  would be related to the inefficiency term 
in the cost equation,  but flexible functional forms such as the translog 
preclude the derivation of an analytic representation of this relationship 
(see  Bauer,  Ferrier,  and Lovell,  1988).  Some researchers,  notably Schmidt 
(1984), Melfi (1984), and Bauer  (1985).  have approximated this relationship, 
but there is no compelling reason to prefer these previous approaches to the 
one employed here--namely,  modeling the disturbances on the cost and input 
share equations in a qualitatively consistent fashion. 
The likelihood function for this system can be written as where &uu2i-o$,  A-uU/u,,  and F*(*) is the standard normal distribution 
function.6  Maximum likelihood estimates can be obtained for all the 
parameters in (2),  and these estimates will be asymptotically efficient.  One 
can perform a number of specification tests using likelihood ratio tests 
similar to  those proposed by Stevenson  (1980). 
While estimating the cost frontier yields useful information about 
best-practice technology  (such  as output cost elasticities, price elasticities 
of substitution,  and the rate of change in technological progress),  estimates 
of overall cost inefficiency yield additional information about individual 
firm performance over time.  The steps required to obtain estimates of these 
terms are discussed below. 
First, the technique of Jondrow,  Lovell,  Materov, and Schmidt  (1982)  is 
extended to adjust for the estimation of a cost frontier--not  a production 
frontier--and for the use of an inefficiency disturbance that is a 
truncated-normal--not  a half-normal random variable  (the  latter being a 
special case of the former).  The conditional density of u given (-u+v  is 
for u 2 0, 
which is just a normal random variable,  N( ((O~+~~)/O~,U~)  ,  truncated at zero, where a:  - ut</u2.  One can use either the mode or the mean of this conditional 
distribution as a point estimate of u, 
where tpp/(uX)+(X/u.  Materov  (1981)  has shown that the mode can be 
interpreted as the maximum likelihood estimator of u,  given (=u+v.  Note 
that, in practice,  the terms required to compute M(ul()  and E(ul()  are 
unobserved and must be replaced by estimates of these parameters. 
Asymptotically, the measurement errors on these terms disappear as the-sample 
size increases; however,  u  would still be known imperfectly since ( contains 
only imperfect information about u.  7 
Given estimates of the cost frontier and cost efficiency, one can use the 
technique described below to decompose observed TFP into its various 
components.  For multiproduct firms,  observed TFP growth can be defined as 
PJYJ  WiXi  (6)  TFP - pP -  F,  where 9'-  --ii- )iJ,  R-  plyi,  and F -  ~i,, 
J  i  i 
P  where y , F,  wi,  xi,  and C refer to the revenue-weighted index of output, a 
cost share index of aggregate input usage, the price of the i-th input, the 
observed use of the i-th input,  and the observed cost,  respectively.  8,9 Using the same basic steps outlined in Bauer (1988).  one can show the 
observed TFP  growth for a multiproduct firm to be equal to the following 
expression in the presence of network effects: 
This expression breaks down the total factor productivity growth into terms 
related to ray returns to scale,  changes in cost efficiency, technological 
progress,  and changes in the network.  Thus,  observed TFP  growth depends not 
only on changes in outputs  (if  there are nonconstant ray returns to scale) and 
technological progress  (which  is the standard decomposition), but also on 
changes in network characteristics and cost efficiency.  Improvements in the 
network and increases in cost efficiency over time raise the observed TFP 
growth, whereas declines in both lower it. 
The last two terms are leftovers.  The last term simply measures any 
effect nonmarginal cost pricing may have on the observed measure of observed 
TFP  growth.  Denny,  Fuss,  and Waverman  (1981)  have shown that yP-yC under 
marginal cost and proportional markup pricing.  The next-to-last term adjusts 
for any bias introduced by measuring aggregate input usage with observed 
rather than least-cost input shares. IV.  Results 
This section describes the results obtained by estimating the system of 
equations described in the previous section with data from the U.S. airline 
industry.  First,  the choice of an appropriate functional form is considered. 
Then the data set employed in this study is described.  Finally, the empirical 
results are reported, and their implications discussed. 
The following translog system of cost and input share equations was 
estimated--again,  omitting firm and time subscripts: 
+ 1/2 1  1  ~w,wlnwilnwj  + u + v,  and 
i  j  IJ 
- B,  + 18,  1nyJ  + 1  B  w.w.  lnwj  + wi,  i - 1  ,...,  M. 
l1J  J  1J 
The network and time variables were not interacted with input prices, in order 
to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and to lessen the effects 
of multicollinearity.  Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices impose 
the following restrictions on the cost system: By construction, Csi(y,w)=l,  so that one input share equation must be 
i 
dropped before estimation to avoid singularity.  Barten  (1969)  has 
shown that, asymptotically, the parameter estimates are invariant as to which 
input share equation is dropped. 
The data set employed in this paper was constructed by Robin Sickles using 
the AIMS 41  form that all interstate airlines were required to submit 
periodically as part of the CAB'S regulation of the industry.  lo  The panel of 
data is composed of 12 firms over 48  quarters from 1970:IQ to 1981:IVQ.  The 
airline industry is considered to produce revenue passenger miles  (y  )  and 
P 
revenue cargo ton miles  (y  )  using four inputs: labor  (L),  capital  (K),  energy 
C 
(E),  and materials  (M).  Labor is an aggregate of 55 separate labor accounts. 
Capital is a combination of flight equipment,  ground equipment,  and landing 
fees.  Energy is the quantity of fuel used,  converted to  BTU equivalents. 
Materials is an aggregate of 56 different accounts composed mainly of 
advertising, insurance,  commissions,  and passenger meals. 
Two additional and important variables account for the network through 
which airlines supply their output,  since the network will influence the cost 
of supplying any given level of output.  The network variables included in 
this study are the average load factor, z  (the  proportion of an airline's  ldf 
capacity actually sold in a given quarter), and the average stage length, z  (the  average distance of an airline's  flights in a given quarter).  stgl 
These two network characteristics are incorporated into the two translog cost 
models as presented in equation  (8). 
The maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters of this cost system 
are reported in table 1.  These parameters derive from a model slightly more 
restricted than the one developed in section 111.  Instead of the more general 
truncated-normal distribution,  the half-normal distribution was assumed for 
the cost inefficiency term in the cost equation.  This is equivalent to 
restricting p4, a restriction that could not be rejected using a likelihood 
ratio test based on these results and on those of the more general model. 
Since the data had been standardized about the sample means before 
estimation, the linear terms in the translog functional form describe some of 
the economic properties of the cost function for the "average" firm in the 
industry.  The estimates for B  and B  indicate that the typical 
Y 
P  Yc 
airline experiences roughly constant ray returns to scale,  since a 1-percent 
increase in revenue passenger miles and revenue cargo ton miles increases 
costs by  approximately 0.856 percent and 0.140  percent,  respectively, for a 
combined total of 0.996 percent if both outputs were increased by 1 percent. 
White  (1979)  surveyed the then-existing literature on scale economies in the 
airline industry and also found no evidence for increasing returns to scale 
for the typical airline.  11 
The estimates of the various output elasticities for each firm averaged 
over time appear in table 2.  The largest four airlines  (American, Delta, 
Eastern,  and United) have all exhausted the cost savings to be gained from increasing their scale of operations radially.  The smallest four airlines 
(Frontier, North Central, Ozark,  and Piedmont) all enjoy some room for 
expanding their operations. 
Figure 2 graphs the estimated multiproduct cost function to illustrate how 
costs vary with the level and mix of outputs.  Input prices and the network 
variables are held at their sample averages.  The cost function  has a fairly 
constant slope,  suggesting that there are roughly constant returns to scale 
over a wide range of outputs and that there are few cost savings from joint 
production.  In fact,  an airline producing one-tenth of the average levels of 
passenger and cargo output has a ray cost elasticity of  0.880, whereas an 
airline producing 10 times the average levels of output has a ray cost 
elasticity of 1.09,  so that there is some curvature. 
Figure 3,  which plots the cost contours as the amounts of the two outputs 
vary  (again, holding the other variables at their averages),  illustrates the 
lack of economies or diseconomies of joint production.  These cost contours 
are fairly flat except near the two axes  (this  observation is more clearly 
seen in figure 1).  Over most regions,  there is a fairly constant trade-off 
between passenger output and cargo output as measured by total costs.  A 
formal test of economies of scope is not possible here since the translog cost 
function is undefined if one of the outputs is zero.  Also,  since no firms in 
the sample produced just one of the outputs,  and since the translog functional 
form is guaranteed to be a good approximation of the true cost funtion  only at 
a point,  it would be difficult to  gauge how much credence to give such a test 
even if it could be performed.  It can be shown that a firm producing the 
average amount of both outputs does not exhibit cost complementarities, 
since -  ad >o. 
aypayc The typical cost-efficient firm would spend about 10.0 percent on  capital, 
46.9 percent on labor,  23.2 percent on energy,  and the remaining 19.9 percent 
on materials,  given the parameter estimates that correspond to the linear 
terms for capital, labor, energy,  and materials.  Table 3 presents estimates 
of the price elasticities of substitution averaged over time.  All of the 
own-price elasticities of substitution are negative and inelastic.  The 
derived demand for capital is the most elastic, whereas the demand for energy 
is the least elastic. 
The cross-price elasticities of substitution are even more inelastic.  The 
derived demand for capital is the most elastic, rising 0.702 percent when the 
price of labor increases 1 percent.  In short, there appear to be few 
opportunities for substitution among the various inputs in the airline 
industry. 
The network and time index parameters all have the expected signs. 
Increasing the average load factor 10 percent lowers costs by about 6.6 
percent, and increasing the average stage length 10 percent lowers costs 2.9 
percent, all other variables held constant.  Increasing the average load 
factor or the average stage length enables an airline to serve the same level 
of outputs with fewer flights.  Inputs are used more effectively,  with fewer 
costly takeoffs and landings.  The coefficient on the time index indicates 
that technological progress was advancing at a rate of 0.274  percent a 
quarter,  implying that the cost frontier is shifting down at a rate of 
slightly more than 1 percent a year.12 This is slower than the rate found by 
Sickles, Good,  and Johnson (1986), who estimated a generalized-Leontief system 
of equations related to  a.  distorted profit function. 
There is support for the presence of cost inefficiency in the data since X  is statistically significant.  Under the null hypothesis that X-O,  only 
noise is present.  Also, the statistical significance of one of the three 
estimated ai's  (the  one for capital) further supports the presence of cost 
inefficiency in general and allocative inefficiency in particular.  The 
airlines tended to overemploy capital,  underemploy labor, and use a roughly 
appropriate share of energy and materials over time. 
The three possible estimates for the firm inefficiency measures appear in 
table 4a.13  The estimates of cost inefficiency by firm are remarkably 
invariant to the estimator employed,  yielding cost inefficiency estimates of 
approximately the same level across measures for each firm and the same 
ranking of firms from most to least efficient.  l4  While these estimates of 
cost inefficiency may seem large  (the  overall average is about 7 percent),  in 
fact they may be biased downward since no airline in the sample operated near 
the cost frontier. 
Bailey,  Graham and Kaplan  (1985)  used 1981 accounting data to compare the 
cost of three airlines  (United  Airlines,  Piedmont, and Southwest) serving a 
200-mile route.  Even after adjusting for differences in the quality of 
service,  seating densities,  flight crew complements, and aircraft utilization 
rates, Piedmont's and United's costs  (which  the adjustments lowered by 25 
percent) were still 50 percent higher than Southwest's--an airline not 
included in this data set since it never came under CAB regulation. 
Table 4b presents cost inefficiency estimates,  pre-  and post-deregulation. 
The average level of inefficiency in the industry rose about 10 percent on 
average from 1979 to 1981.  The estimates of inefficiency for seven of the 12 
airlines increased,  and for four airlines the increase exceeded 20 percent. 
This is exactly the opposite of what one would have expected to happen. Figure 4  plots the deseasonalized average level of  cost inefficiency in the 
airline industry over time.  Peaks in cost inefficiency coincide closely with 
recessions  (roughly  1970,  1974, the first half of 1980, and the second half of 
1981), with oil price shocks  (early  1974 and early 1979),  and with air traffic 
controller strikes  (summer  1981). 
The relationship between cost inefficiency and changes in regulatory 
control is more difficult to infer.  The CAB'S  internal reforms allowing 
discount fares in 1977 and allowing airlines some latitude to set their own 
fares in 1978  (airlines  could raise their fares 10 percent above or 70 percent 
below the Standard Industry Fare Level  (SIFL)  set by the CAB without approval) 
did appear to reduce cost inefficiency.  If the ADA,  passed in October 1978, 
further improved airline cost efficiency, the effect was more than offset by 
the many shocks that buffeted the industry since 1979. 
These results differ somewhat from the results found by Sickles, Good,  and 
Johnson  (1986).  Using their distorted profit framework,  they found a fairly 
uniform convergence from high foregone profits at the beginning of the 1970s 
to almost no foregone profits by 1981.  They credit the largest reductions in 
foregone profits to internal reforms the CAB undertook before the ADA,  such as 
creating the SIFL,  permitting multiple route authorizations, promoting easier 
entry into new markets,  and speeding approval of discount fares. 
Of course, one would like to have more current data to determine the long- 
run effect of the ADA on cost efficiency in the industry.  Interestingly,  of 
the eight airlines that have gone bankrupt or have been acquired since 1981, 
five had increases in their estimates of cost inefficiency.  Of the four 
airlines that have maintained their independence,  the average estimate of cost 
inefficiency of only one increased. Table 5 reports the results of the TFP decomposition technique.  The 
observed TFP grew,  on  average,  for all of the firms,  although a great deal of 
variation  occurred across firms.  Much of this increase is the result of 
technological progress which, as reported earlier, increased the TFP growth at 
a rate of 0.274 percent a quarter.  The scale effect was a significant source 
of TFP gains for the smaller airlines,  which were free to grow under the 
regulatory reform process,  but not for the largest four airlines.  The 
inefficiency effects varied considerably from airline to airline, but were 
generally small.  Over time,  however,  changes in the airlines' networks have 
generally boosted productivity.  The average load factors and stage lengths of 
the airlines have risen  (although  unevenly across airlines),  each resulting in 
increases in the observed TFP of about the same order of magnitude as those 
attributable to technological progress. 
The biases in the observed measure of TFP as a result of nonmarginal cost 
pricing  (the  output effect) and as a result of the observed input shares not 
being equal to the least cost input shares  (the  price effect) exert only a 
small effect on the observed TFP.  In general,  these estimates indicate that 
the observed measure of TFP is a biased estimate of technological progress, 
not just because of the scale and output effects--as Denny,  Fuss,  and Waverman 
(1981)  have shown--but also because of the efficiency,  network, and input 
price effects. 
Tables 6a and 6b show the changes in observed TFP growth before and after 
deregulation,  respectively.  The observed TFP growth dropped sharply after  . 
deregulation.  Most of this drop is a result of the lower load factors 
experienced by the airlines for much of the period after deregulation.  The 
load factor effect went from increasing the observed TFP growth by 0.41 percent before deregulation to decreasing it 0.36 percent after deregulation. 
This result is understandable given that the airline industry is highly 
procyclical; load factors generally plummet during a sluggish economy like the 
one that prevailed from 1980 to 1981. 
The airlines apparently made good use of their new freedom to.set  their 
own route structures.  The stage length effect on observed TFP growth more 
than doubled after deregulation,  from 0.21 percent to 0.53 percent per 
quarter.  The scale effect also led to faster observed TFP growth after 
deregulation, primarily because the smaller airlines moved toward the minimum 
efficient scale.  All but Continental among the larger airlines eliminated the 
drag on observed TFP growth by adjusting their mix of outputs or reducing 
their scale of operations. 
V.  Analysis and Conclusions 
This paper describes and helps explain the airline industry's early 
adaptations to the new deregulated environment.  First,  the existence of a 
significant amount of cost inefficiency in the airline industry  (about  6.8 
percent before 1979) explains the rush of new entrants into the industry once 
the CAB no longer inhibited entry.  The absence of an increase in cost 
efficiency as late as 1981 suggests that the airline industry is not perfectly 
contestable.  Events in the industry do suggest that competition may exercise 
its guiding hand,  as the firms whose cost efficiency increased tended to 
survive,  while all but one of the others went bankrupt or were taken over. 
Second,  opportunities for substitution among inputs are limited, implying 
that the airlines pass through much of the oil price increases as higher costs that ultimately reach travelers as higher fares.  Thus, the airlines were 
distressed in the early 1980s by downturns in the national economy, and they 
were also hurt by the oil price jump in 1979.  Both of these shocks caused the 
drop in average load factors in the 1979-1981  period,  and caused the load 
factor effect on observed TFP  growth to drop from 0.41 percent'to  -0.36 
percent per quarter on average.  The limited substitutability among inputs 
also helps to explain why the airlines as a group have been so eager to 
control their labor costs, at a time when their competitors need not 
necessarily match wage increases. 
The airlines did take advantage of their new freedom to set their own 
route structures after deregulation,  and from 1979 to 1981, the observed TFP 
growth rose 0.32  percent faster per quarter as a result of the airlines' 
increasing their average stage lengths.  But without the airlines' new freedom 
to set their own fares--and particularly their ability to offer restricted 
discount fares--average  load factors might have been even lower.  At the end 
of this sample, the airline industry as a whole had started to move 
aggressively toward hub-and-spoke networks,  and these results make it clear 
why they would want to.  Hub-and-spoke networks tend to increase average stage 
lengths and load factors,  both of which lower airline costs.  United Airlines 
introduced another technique in 1981 for increasing average load factors,  the 
now ubiquitous frequent-flier plans. 
The last major development in the airline industry since deregulation is 
the merger wave that hit the industry in 1986.  The largest airlines had 
exhausted any scale or scope economies by late 1981.  Thus,  one can base no 
explanation for the merger wave on the argument that airlines were trying to 
achieve minimum efficient scale.  One could,  however,  argue that the adoption of hub-and-spoke  networks has increased the minimum efficient scale in the 
industry.  Unfortunately, one cannot use the data in this study to test this 
hypothesis,  except to reiterate that if hub-and-spoke networks increase 
average stage lengths and load factors, they could partially offset any 
diseconomies of scale. 
The switch to hub-and-spoke route networks and the demands they place on 
acquiring gate space and takeoff and landing slots at the most desirable 
airports best explain the 1986 merger wave.  Given the difficulties in 
acquiring these resources  (gates  typically are leased for long periods and 
landing slots tend to be grandfathered to their current carriers),  it is 
easier and probably cheaper for an airline to expand by purchasing another 
airline with the desired gate space and landing slots than to expand. 
internally. 
In conclusion,  two relatively new empirical techniques helped to shed 
light on changes that have occurred in the airline industry in the last 10 
years.  One would like to extend this data set closer to the present to 
determine whether the airlines have actually increased their cost efficiency 
since 1981.  One could also study whether the switch to hub-and-spoke networks 
caused a shift in the cost function that makes a larger scale of operations 
more desirable.  These issues must be addressed in future research. Footnotes 
1.  The issue of  how to model the relationship between the disturbances on  the 
cost equation and the input share equations,  given that deviations from 
cost-efficient input shares should raise observed costs,  is frequently 
referred to as the Greene Problem  (see  Greene, 1980). 
2.  For a more complete economic analysis of the airline industry under CAB 
regulation,  see Douglas and Miller  (1974). 
3.  Two excellent texts on the early deregulatory experience are Bailey, 
Graham, and Kaplan  (1985)  and Meyer and Oster  (1981). 
4.  The network characteristics are anything that affects the firm's  costs of 
delivering the output or service to consumers. 
5.  Since technical efficiency is the equiproportional  over employment of all 
inputs, it does not appear in the input share equations. 
6.  One input share equation must be dropped to avoid singularity. 
Kopp and Diewert  (1982)  developed a technique for further decomposing the 
estimate of overall cost efficiency into estimates of technical and 
allocative inefficiency,  and Zieschang  (1983)  improved the technique. 
This technique was employed,  but it yielded estimates of technical and 
allocative efficiency that were pot bounded by zero and one.  The problem 
may be that while the estimated cost function is usually concave in input 
prices in the neighborhood of the observed input prices,  the cost function 
is not globally concave in input prices.  Imposing global concavity in 
input prices may solve this problem,  but this was not attempted. 
8.  Variables with a dot over them are defined to be the time rate of change 
in the variable (dlnz/dt). 
9.  Denny,  Fuss, and Waverman  (1981)  discuss the properties of this definition 
of multiproduct total factor productivity growth in more detail. 
10.  For a more detailed description of this data set,  see Sickles  (1985). 
11. Most of these studies explicitly treated the airlines as single-product 
firms,  so it is reassuring to note that this result holds in a 
multiproduct generalization. 
12. Given the particular form of the translog-type function that was 
estimated,  technological progress is constrained to be the same for all 
firms over time.  This formulation is imposed to limit the number of 
parameters to be estimated and to reduce the effects of multicollinearity. 13. For some Monte Carlo results on the properties of these types of 
estimators, see Waldman  (1984). 
14. These estimates of cost inefficiency are the increases in log cost, which 
are roughly the proportion by which observed cost exceeds minimum cost. 
To obtain the Farrell measure of cost efficiency, raise e to the negative 
of these values. Figure 1  Cost-Minimization Problem 
Source:  Author's  calculations. Table 1 





































*Not  statistically significant at  the 0.01 level of significance. 
Source: Author's  calculations 2  5 
Table 2 
Output Cost Elasticities 
Airline  Passenger 
AA  (American)  0.859 
AL (Allegheny/now US Air)  0.901 
BR  (Braniff)  0.823 
CO  (Continental)  0.782 
DL  (Delta)  0.938 
EA  (Eastern)  0.942 
FL  (Frontier)  0.887 
NC  (North  Central)  0.827 
OZ  (Ozark)  0.799 
PI  (Piedmont)  0.862 
UA  (United)  0.873 
WA (Western)  0.880 
Cargo 
Table 3 
Price Elasticities of Substitution 
Input pair1  Elasticity 
 he  key to decoding these input pairs is  the following: alnx,(y,w,z,t) 
a",  - €ij. 
Source: Author's calculations Cost Table 4a 




Cost Inefficiency Estimates (increase  in log cost) 
Table 4b 
Cost Inefficiency Estimates Pre-  and Post-Deregulation, 
Using E(uj<) (increase in log cost) 
Source: Author's calculations. Figure  4  Cost  Inefficiency  (E (u/e)) 
cn 
0  0.0  10.0  20.0  30.0  40.0  50.0 
Number  of warters Since  1970:IQ 
Source:  Author's  calculations. Table 5 
Airline  TFP 
Overall 0.8107 
TFP Decomposition 
(Average  quarterly rate of change, in percent) 
Scale  Output 
Effect  Effect 
Ef  f  .  Technical  Price 





 h he TFP reported in these tables is best defined as being the 
estimated observed change in total factor productivity,  since it is obtained 
by summing the various components. 
Source: Author's calculations. Table 6a 
Airline  TFP 
Overall 0.9830 
Airline  TFP 
Overall 0.2405 
TFP Decomposition--Before  Deregulation 
(Average  quarterly rate of change, in percent) 
Scale  Output  Eff.  Technical  Price  Load 
Effect  Effect  Effect  Change  Effect  Factor 
Table 6b 
TFP Decomposition-  -After Deregulation 
(Average  quarterly rate of change,  in percent) 
Scale  Output  Eff.  Technical  Price  Load 





Source: Author's calculations. References 
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